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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1954 the Salt Lake City Commission 
passed an ordinance known as Section 4865 entitled "Ad-
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vertising Prices of Prescription Eyeglasses, Lenses, or 
Frames and Prescription Lenses." This ordinance among 
other things prohibited individuals, firms, corporations or 
associations from advertising the price of eyeglasses, lenses 
or frames at a definite or fixed price. The ordinance is 
set out verbatim in the brief of appellants at Page 2 and 
3, and is set out at Page 5 and 6 of the Record. 
On the 21st day of September 1954, the Respondents 
filed a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
seeking injunction restraining the City and its officers and 
agents from enforcing or undertaking any activities in 
connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid ordinance 
on the grounds that the ordinance was invalid and uncon-
stitutional. 
In conjunction with the filing of the complaint Re-
spondents obtained an Order from Judge Ellett requiring 
the Appellants to show cause on the 23rd day of Septem-
ber, 1954, why they should not be restrained from enforc-
ing the ordinance during the pendency of the action. Prior 
to the hearing plaintiff amended its complaint to bring the 
complaint within the provisions of the Declaratory J udg-
ment Statute (R. 11). The City filed Motion to Dismiss 
raising the question of the sufficiency of the amended com-
plaint. 
On the 23rd day of September the Order to Show Cause 
was heard before Judge Ellett. At the conclusion of argu-
ments by counsel the Court indicated pro forma that He 
believed the ordinance to be both invalid and unconstitu-
tional. Prior to formal ruling both parties filed a Stipula· 
tion and a Consent so that the case could be submitted for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
final judgment. In the Stipulation it was agreed that the 
Respondent owned under a proper registration a business 
known as King Optical Company, which Company manu-
factures, processes and dispenses optical goods in the State 
of Illinois. It was also agreed that Respondents operate 
in Salt Lake City an optical store in which they sell optical 
goods consisting of lenses, frames and eyeglasses to cus-
tomers on prescription from licensed doctors and optome-
trists. It was further agreed that Respondents incident 
to the operation of their business, use various methods of 
advertising, including price advertising in local newspap-
ers and that this type advertising is in violation of the 
ordinance. A copy of the type advertising conducted by 
the Respondents is attached to the Stipulation and is shown 
at Page 16 of the Record. 
As a necessary preliminary to a final judgment the 
City Attorney and George E. Bridwell, acting as one of the 
attorneys for the City, signed a consent in which they 
agreed that the District Court could determine the legal 
point raised by plaintiffs' amended complaint, and expressly 
waived the right to introduce any evidence. It was ex-
pressly provided that this waiver was for the purpose of 
enabling the trial court to decide the issues of constitution-
ality and validity. All material conflicts raised by the 
complaint were deemed denied and controverted except 
as stipulated (R. 17). 
On the lOth day of November, 1954, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order were filed. 
In the Judgment the Court held that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional and invalid. In fairness to the Court it 
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4 
must be stated that the only matter argued and the only 
matter considered by the Court was the provision of the 
ordinance relating to price advertising. It has not been 
contended by either Appellants or Respondents and cer-
tainly was not intended by the Court, that those provisions 
of the ordinance dealing with other matters were in any 
way involved in this decision. 
The foregoing represents a complete reference to the 
facts which were before the Court in this case. The state-
ment of counsel to the effect that "The spokesmen for the 
Utah Medical Society, the Optometric Association, and the 
Society for the Blind will tell you that price advertising 
... will result in deceptive and inferior merchandise ... " 
is purely gratuitous and outside the record (P. 6 Appel-
lant's Brief). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE PROVISION OF THE ORDINANCE DEAL-
ING WITH PRICE ADVERTISING IS INVALID. 
(a) Municipal Ordinances in cities operating 
under delegated powers are strictly construed. 
(b) Authority to limit price advertising of glasses 
and lenses is not expressly granted to the 
City of Salt Lake. 
(c) Power to control price advertising of glasses 
cannot be necessarily or fairly implied as an 
incident to the powers expressly granted. 
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POINT II. 
THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
(a) Introductory. 
(b) The ordinance violates the Utah State Consti-
tional Right of freedom of speech, including 
the right to communicate freely thoughts and 
opinions. 
(c) The ordinance violates the Utah State Consti:. 
tutional provisions prohibiting the enactment 
of special laws. 
(d) The ordinance violates the Utah State Consti-
tutional provision prohibiting combinations 
controlling price of products. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PROVISION OF THE ORDINANCE DEAL-
ING WITH PRICE ADVERTISING IS INVALID. 
(a) Municipal Ordinances in cities operating 
under delegated powers are strictly construed. 
Appellants in their brief under Point 3 argue that 
"The courts are bound by a strong presumption of validity 
of a municipal ordinance." We know of no such rule except 
where the ordinance in question is enacted by a city oper-
ating under a Home Rule Charter. In cities operating under 
authority delegated by the legislature the rule is exactly 
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the reverse of appellants' contention. In Salt Lake City v. 
Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P. 2d 537 ( 1942) the Supreme 
Court cited with approval the general rule set out at Page 
448 I Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed.: 
". . . that a municipal corporation possesses 
and can exercise the following powers, and no 
others : First, those granted in express words; sec-
ond, those necessarily or fairly implied in or inci-
dent to the powers expressly granted; third, those 
essential to the accomplishment of the declared ob-
jects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply 
convenient, but indispensable." 
The Court further referred with approval to Dillon Munici-
pal Corporations, supra, at page 449 where the following 
appears: 
" ... any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt con-
cerning the existence of the power is resolved by 
the courts against th'e corporation [city], and the 
power denied." (Italics ours.) 
It is thus clear that in this state the rule of construc-
tion is strict, and not liberal, as contended by Appellants. 
(b) Authority to limit price advertising of glasses 
and lenses is not expressly granted to the 
City of Salt Lake. 
Title 10, Chap. 8, Sec. 39, U. C. A. 1953, provides that 
cities may 
" . . license, tax and regulate the business 
conducted by merchants, wholesalers and retailers, 
shopkeepers and storekeepers ... " 
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Sec. 61 provides that they may: 
" ... make regulations to secure the general health 
of the city, prevent the introduction of contagious, 
infectious or malignant diseases into the city, and 
make quarantine laws and enforce the same within 
the corporate limits and within twelve miles 
thereof." 
Sec. 84 provides : 
"They may pass all ordinances and rules, and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, neces-
sary for carrying into effect or discharging all 
powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and 
such as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
safety and preserve the health and promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good 
order, comfort and convenience of the city and the 
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of prop-
erty therein; ... " 
The foregoing constitute the only express delegation 
of authority to the city which in any conceivable way could 
relate to the ordinance in question. Clearly, these provi-
sions do not expressly grant to the City power to prohibit 
price advertising of glasses. If such a power exists it must 
be "necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers 
expressly granted." 
(c) Power to control price advertising of glasses 
cannot be necessarily or fairly implied as an 
incident to the powers expressly granted. 
Even a liberal construction of the foregoing legislation 
would not justify an inference that the express words em-
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power the City of Salt Lake to enact an ordinance prohibit-
ing price advertising of eyeglasses. Particularly is this so 
in view of the serious questions concerning the constitu-
tionality of such a provision. (See infra.) 
In Ritholz et al. v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 258, 13 
N. W. 2d 283, the Supreme Court of that State had before 
it a municipal ordinance of the City of Detroit similar to 
the one before this Court. The Court in rendering its deci-
sion went beyond the ultnt vires question and held that 
the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court said: 
"In my opinion the evil sought to be corrected 
by the ordinance is a business evil. The ordinance 
has no relation to public health and is an unlawful 
interference with private business. It is void as 
being in violation of the fourteenth amendment of 
the United States Constitution." 
The only state which has sustained validity of suck an 
ordinance is Oh1:o. That case was Springfield v. Hurst, 56 
N. E. 2d 185, 144 Ohio St. 49. That Court in a divided 
opinion held that an ordinance similar to the one in question 
was constitutional. It did not determine the question raised 
under this point, to-wit: the question of the power of a 
municipality to enact such an ordinance. The reason the 
ultra vires question was not raised in the Ohio case is clear. 
Ohio cities operate under Home Rule Charters and therefore 
are not limited by the strict rule applicable to cities which 
have only those powers which have been expressly desig-
nated by the legislature and those which are necessarily 
implied by reason of the express delegation. The Utah 
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Supreme Court in the Revene case, supra, recognized this 
distinction and stated: 
"The Ohio cases cited by plaintiff ... arise 
under the plenary powers of Home Rule Cities and 
are not authority for the case at bar. They are 
authority only on the question of constitutionality." 
Further reasons for doubting that the legislature dele-
gated to Salt Lake City implied authority to control price 
advertising are the following Constitutional Provisions of 
the State of Utah. 
Art. I, Sec. 24 : 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Art. VI, Sec. 26 : 
"In all cases where a general law can be applic-
able, no special law shall be enacted." 
We must assume that the legislature which delegated 
authority to Salt Lake City to "license, tax, and regulate 
the business conducted by merchants, wholesalers and re-
tailers, shopkeepers and storekeepers" and "make regula-
tions to secure the general health of the city ... " contem-
plated that the city would enact only those laws customarily 
or ordinarily controlled by cities and which are not general 
in nature. 
Certainly any law controlling price advertising of any 
commodity, including eyeglasses, is of such uniform applic-
ability, that it is difficult to assume that the legislature 
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ever intended such law be enacted by City ordinance. When, 
and if, such law is enacted, it should be first considered by 
the policy-making bodies, to-wit, the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the State Government. 
We have made diligent search and have failed to find 
an ordinance dealing with the control of price advertising 
of optical goods which has been held valid in any state except 
the Home Rule State of Ohio. Considering the serious con-
stitutional questions which attach to legislation of this 
kind it seems inconceivable under the strict rule of con-
struction approved by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah that the power of a city to enact an ordinance in 
such a questionable field could be necessarily or reasonably 
implied from the express powers given especially under a 
rule of construction which states that "any fair, reasonable, 
substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is 
resolved by the courts against the corporation." 
After Judge Ellett had made his ruling in the instant 
case, the problem was presented to the last session of the 
Legislature in the form of Senate Bill 17, which was intro-
duced in the House as House Bill No. 68. This Bill, among 
other things, prohibited price advertising by opticians. In 
effect it was designed to accomplish the same purpose for 
which the questioned ordinance was designed. Both the 
Senate and the House passed this proposed legislation. 
Thereafter it was vetoed by the Governor who wrote the 
following veto message: 
"In accordance with Article VII, Section 8, Con-
stitution of Utah (relating to the governor's veto 
power), I am returning herewith S. B. 17, entitled 
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Dispensing Opticians' Code, which I do not approve 
and am hereby vetoing. My reasons for doing this 
were formulated only after hearing both proponents 
and opponents of this bill over the past several days. 
"I am advised by the Attorney General's office 
that the part of the act prohibiting price advertising 
of glasses is of questionable constitutionality. I am 
also advised that a District Court Judge of the Third 
Judicial District has ruled that a Salt Lake City 
ordinance designed to accomplish the same purpose 
was unconstitutional, and that this case is now being 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
"My objection, however, goes beyond the pos-
sible question of constitutionality. I am in sympathy 
with optometrists who desire to improve the stan-
dards of optometry and the quality of glasses sold 
to the public. Insofar as this bill tends to accomplish 
these purposes it has my full approval. I am, how-
ever, strongly opposed to any legislation promoted 
by one class or group which in any way deprives 
others of fundamental rights unless there is some J 
clear showing that the public interest will be served} 
"In an effort to determine for my own satis-
faction this fact, I have given supporters of the bill 
at least two opportunities to show me wherein pro-
hibiting an optician from advising a customer be-
forehand of the price of glasses in any way protected 
the public. 
"I have not yet heard any argument which con-
vinces me that this would be the fact. 
"Existing state statutes now prohibit false, 
misleading and fraudulent advertising. Those pro-
visions of the proposed legislation which support 
this general purpose are certainly not objectionable. 
Whoever inserted the provision prohibiting price 
advertising apparently presupposed that any opti-
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cian who advertises price is dishonest and guilty 
of baiting the public. 
"But what of the honest optician who desires 
to advise the public beforehand of the price of a pair 
of glasses? Must this fundamental right be taken 
away from him? I see no reason for prohibiting 
honest price advertising. 
"Finally I am not unmindful of the fact that 
price advertising, so long as it is truthful, may have 
a very wholesome effect on the price of glasses paid 
by the public in general. I will not be a party to any 
law which would in any way prevent the public 
from being fully informed of these facts. 
"For these reasons and because of my duty as 
governor to the people of this state, I feel it is my 
duty to enter this veto." 
From the foregoing, of which this court can take judi- 1 
cial knowledge, it is apparent that at least the Executive 
Department of the state government and many of the legis-
lators were opposed to a state statute prohibiting price 
advertising. In view of this fact it would be strange indeed 
to imply from the express powers given to municipalities, 
an implied power to enact into law that which the highest 
policy-making branches of the government have determined 
should not become law. 
Title 58, Chap. 16, provides statutory regulations 
for the control of optometrists. In Section 13, sub-section 
(3) it is provided that: 
"The following persons are exempt from the 
operation of this chapter: ... 
"(3) Persons who sell eyeglasses or spectacles 
as articles of merchandise; provided, (a) they do so 
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in the ordinary course of trade from permanently 
located and established places of business; (b) they 
do not traffic or attempt to traffic upon assumed 
skill in testing the eye and adapting lenses thereto; 
(c) they do not duplicate or replace or accept for 
duplication or replacement any lens or lenses unless 
they are exclusive wholesale optical establishments; 
(d) they do not use in the testing of the eye lenses 
other than the lenses actually sold ; (e) they do not 
give or offer eyeglasses or spectacles as premiums." 
(Italics ours.) 
This provision of the statute on a legislative level clearly 
excepts opticians from the operation of the act. In Golding 
v. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P. 2d 871, the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the Court could not ex-
tend statutes regulating the practice of optometry to bar 
department store and optical company operating concessions 
from employing licensed optometrists to examine and pre-
scribe for patients or from advertising service of such op-
tometrists, as statutes did not make such practice illegal, 
and the Court could not concern itself with what legislature 
should have done, but only with statutes as they were 
enacted. In this same case the Court held that employment 
of a licensed optometrist by the Schubach Optical Company 
for the purpose of examining patients' eyes and prescribing 
lenses and the advertising of such services, was not against 
public policy or legislative enactment and therefore could 
not be enjoined. 
Inasmuch as the legislature has clearly exempted op-
ticians from the operation of the Optometry Act, which 
attempts to regulate but not prohibit price advertising, it 
would seem clear that the legislature did not intend that 
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14 
municipalities be empowered to do that which it itself had 
chosen not to do. 
It is clear from the general statutes of the State of 
Utah that false, fraudulent and misleading advertising of 
all types is prohibited. If the Legislature had intended to 
take a step as broad as that prohibiting price advertising it 
certainly could have done so. It is true that the professions 
regulate the conduct of their members and that lawyers, 
~octors and dentists, on a professional basis, prohibit ad-
vertising. We, however, have been unable to find anywhere 
in the Utah statutes, even in those statutes dealing with 
the regulation and control of professions, any statutory 
prohibitions or regulations controlling the advertising of 
prices. Until the Legislature has so spoken it seems un-
reasonable to assume that the power to enact such ques-
tionable law can be implied from the express delegation 
of power to regulate granted to municipalities. 
POINT II. 
THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
(a) Introductory. 
We believe, as contended under Point I herein, that 
the ordinance in question is invalid because it is ultra vires, 
therefore we do not believe that the constitutional question 
should concern this court. However, should this Honorable 
Court disagree with our contention and hold that the power 
to pass such an ordinance has been delegated to the City 
the question of constitutionality could become a real issue. 
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The question of the constitutionality of statutes regu-
lating price advertising has been considered in several 
jurisdictions. (See Commonwealth v. Ferris, (1940) 305 
Mass. 233, 25 N. E. 2d 378; State ex rel. Booth et al. V. 
Beck Jewelry Enterprises, Inc. et al. (1942) 220 Ind. 276, 
41 N. E. 2d 622; Ritholz v. City of Detroit (1944) 308 
Mich. 258, 13 N. \V. 2d 283; City of Springfield v. Hurst, 
(1944) 144 Ohio St. 49, 56 N. E. 2d 185; Ritholz v. Johnson 
(1945) 246 \Vis. 442,17 N. vV. 2d 590; Ritholz v. Common-
wealth (1945) 184 Va. 339, 35 S. E. 2d 210; State v. Ranes, 
223 La. 839, 67 So. 2d 99) . 
The foregoing cases all dealt with state statutes, with 
the exception of the City of Springfield case, which dealt 
with a municipal ordinance. As herein pointed out the 
Springfield case involved an ordinance enacted by a Home 
Rule City and therefore the question of ultra vires was not 
discussed. 
From the foregoing cases it appears that there is a 
split of authority as to whether or not such statutes are 
constitutional. In most all of the cases deciding this ques-
tion one or more of the judges dissented. 
In the Detroit case and in the Beck Jewelry case, supra, 
the courts squarely held that statutes attempting to pro-
hibit price advertising are unconstitutional. In the Johnson 
case supra, the court in reality did not decide the question 
of constitutionality, but determined the case on a proced-
ural ground, holding that an action in equity to enjoin en-
forcement of an entire ordinance would not justify the 
relief prayed for because some of the ordinance was un-
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doubtedly valid. (The Johnson case was not brought under 
a Declaratory Judgment Act.) The court did however indi-
cate by dicta a position favorable to the proposition that 
such legislation is constitutional. The Virginia case is of 
doubtful value on the question of constitutionality because 
the act construed was an Optometry Act and not primarily 
an act to regulate the merchandising of eyeglasses by op-
ticians. In the Virginia case the court acknowledged that 
some jurisdictions were contrary to the position taken by 
the Virginia case. The court said : 
"Respondents further contend that a statute 
prohibiting a party who is expressly authorized to 
sell spectacles and eyeglasses from advertising the 
prices is invalid because it violates the Bill of Rights, 
sec. 1, and the due process clause, sec. 11, of the 
Constitution of Virginia. In other words, the con-
tention is that this specific regulation as to quoting 
prices is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it un-
duly interferes with respondents' right to conduct 
a business expressly authorized by statute. 
"On this question the courts are divided. Some 
hold that provisions prohibiting such advertisements 
quoting prices are arbitrary and an unreasonable 
restraint of a lawful business. See Regal Oil Co. v. 
State, 123 N. J. L. 456, 10 A. 2d 495; Golding v. 
Schuba.ch Optical Co., . . Utah ... , 70 P. 2d 871; 
State ex rel. Booth v. Beck Jewelry Enterprises, Inc., 
41 N. E. 2d 622, 141 A. L. R. 876; and see discus-
sions in Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, Conn., 179 A. 
195, 98 A. L. R. 897 (reversed for the taking of 
additional evidence) ; and State, by Ervin v. Good-
man, Minn., 288 N. W. 157." (Italics ours.) 
We would like to believe that the quotation from the 
Virginia case correctly states the position taken by the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. We think, however, 
that the Schubach case referred does not hold that price 
advertising is unconstitutional. It does hold, contrary to 
decision in the Virginia case, that optometry is not a pro-
fession. 
We believe that the question of Constitutionality in the 
instant case rests on the Constitutional provisions set out 
in the Utah State Constitution. We do not clain'i that the or-
dinance violates the Federal Constitutional provisions. 
_(b) The ordinance violates the Utah State Consti-
tional Right of freedom of speech, including 
the right to communicate freely thoughts and 
opinions. 
Art. 1, Sec. 1, provides as follows: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; 
to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to 
assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances ; to communicate 
freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible 
for the abuse of that right." (Italics ours.) 
Art. I, Sec. 1, supra, goes further than any pro-
vision in the Federal Constitution. It not only guarantees 
the right of freedom of speech, but affirmatively guaran-
tees the right "to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right." 
Legislation prohibiting truthful price advertising 
would be nothing more than legislation prohibiting citizens 
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from "communicating freely their thoughts and opinions." 
Consistent with this guarantee is the provision providing 
responsibility for the free communication of thoughts and 
opinions. State statutes so provide in that they generally 
prohibit false, fraudulent and n1isleading advertising. We 
submit that a prohibition eliminating truthful advertising 
by a merchant of any product which can be legally sold 
violates the foregoing provision. 
Art. 1, Sec. 15, provides: 
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain 
the freedom of speech or of the press." 
The foregoing provision is similar to the provision 
contained in the First Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution. It, of course, is not as specific as the provisions 
contained in Art. I, Sec. 1 of the Utah State Constitution. 
In Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah 495, 151 Pac. 51, the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that a statute regulating the 
working hours of all employees of mercantile establish-
ments and requiring such establishments, including mens' 
furnishing stores and jewelry businesses, to close at 6 :00 
o'clock was unconstitutional. During the course of its 
opinions the Court said : 
"We think it also offends against constitutional 
rights to enjoy, acquire and possess property, the 
most valuable of which is that of alienation, the 
1·ight to vend and sell." (Italics ours.) 
(c) The ordinance violates the Utah State Consti-
tutional provisions prohibiting the enactment 
of special laws. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
Art. I, Sec. 24 provides : 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Art. VI, Sec. 26, among other things, provides : 
"In all cases where a general law can be applic-
able, no special law shall be enacted." 
The ordinance in question specially selects one type 
of merchandise which can be legally sold and prohibits price 
advertising of the same. What is there about eyeglasses 
and frames which entitle them to this special considera-
tion? If price advertising is to be prohibited why should 
such prohibition apply only to glasses? Why not hearing 
aids, aspirin, prosthesis of all kinds, and for that matter 
food and medicines. To select only glasses gives away the 
whole plot. It reveals such legislation in its true light. It 
is designed to appease only a special group, to-wit, the 
optometrists and opticians competing with Respondents. 
If the public welfare is at stake all merchandise of a class 
should be considered in one statute or ordinance prohibit-
ing price advertising generally. 
The foregoing Utah State Constitutional Provisions, 
prohibiting special law, are not contained in the Federal 
Constitution. 
(d) The ordinance violates the Utah State Consti-
tutional provision prohibiting combinations 
controlling price of products. 
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Art. XII, Sec. 20 provides, among other things, the 
following: 
,] 
"Any combination by individuals, corporations, j 
or associations, having for its object or effect the . 
controlling of the price of any products of the soil, 
or of any article of manufacture or commerce ... 
is ... hereby declared unlawful and against public 
policy." 
We submit that this constitutional provision clearly 
indicates that any legislation or municipal ordinance which 
would tend to accomplish price control would be unconstitu-
tionaL Certainly a prohibition of honest price advertising ::,l 
would tend to have such an effect. ' 
In the second Revne case, Revne v. Trade Commission, ·· 
113 Utah 155, 192 P. 2d 563, the Supreme Court of this.' 
State cited with approval the lower court's finding that the 
foregoing Constitutional Provision prohibited the Trad~ 
Commission from fixing prices of haircuts. The Court l 
finally held that a legislative act delegating the power to l 
fix such prices was an unconstitutional delegation of au- ·~ 
thority. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing we submit that the municipal 
ordinance in question is invalid and unconstitutionaL 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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